University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and
Interviews

Mike Mansfield Papers

1967

Speeches, Central Concerns of American Foreign Policy
Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "Speeches, Central Concerns of American Foreign Policy" (1967). Mike
Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews. 1395.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/1395

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University
of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

HOLD FOR RELEASE OU DELIVERY
ADDRESS BY SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)
Before the
Carolina Forum, The Univer sity of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, North Carolina
Monday, March 13, 1967
8 : 00p . m. (EST)

CENrRAL CONCERNS OF .AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Prior to my coming to Congress a quarter of a century ago, I
thought my stock of solutions to the questions of foreign policy was
quite adequate .

In fact, as a teacher of history at the University of

Montana, which I was, I had a touch of what Senator Fulbright might call
the arr ogance of br ain power.

In more common idiom, there were times

when I thought I knew it all .

That, may I say, is a failing common to

exceptional histor ians, from Her odotus to Schlessinger.
As a new Member of Congress, my background in history was highly
useful .

I also discovered, however , that my knowledge of international

affairs did not go very far .

It did not begin to provide much of an under-

standing, let alone answers, to the critical issues which were emer ging
as \-/orld \o/ar II drew to a close .

In those days , most of us in government

suffer ed f r om serious imperfections in our notions of the outside world
and widely- held but unfounded hopes for an automatic postwar peace under
the United Nations.
We took many wrong tacks- along with the right ones in the course
of our foreign policy.

For cany decades to come, historians will be en-

gaged in sorting out the one from the othE>r .
\-le

made them in Europe .

~·le

made mistakes in Asia.

We made them in the United Nations .

over the whole range of emerging new intE>rnational issues.

We made them
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I, for one, felt my limitations and recognized the need to
become a student again.
the floor.

My classroom was Congress, in Committee and on

My extracurricular activity included a great deal of foreign

travel, extensive reading and not a little reflection.
To tnis day, a student I have remained; an expert I am not; and
teaching is the profession to which, at some point, I may return.

In the

latter connection, I should note that my name is still carried, on leave
of absence, on the roster of the University of Montana.

Moreover, thanks

to a seniority system in college teaching, second not even to that of the
Congress, I now hold the rank of full Professor of History .
I am constrained to point out that teaching and legislating are
the two outstanding examples in American society of the application of a
major tenet of ConfUcianism:

that the accumulation of years is to be

equated automatically and unquestioningly with the accumulation of wisdom.
This principle, I know, is insufferable to the young, tolerable to the
middle-aged, and a comfort to those full of years.

At this point in time,

I must confess that I find a system of seniority tolerably comfortable.
For the present, I have no hesitancy in invoking the authority
with which seniority endows me, in order that I may speak to you on what
seems to me to be the central concerns of contemporary American foreign
policy.

Since the end of World War II, I have watched clusters of inter-

national problems coalesce into these concerns.
whole range of new and tumultuous change.

The problems cover a

They are, in part, ironic by-

products of the immense acceleration of development in science, education
and communication, transportation and other technologies .

They are ex-

pressive of the explosion in population as well as the explosion of nuclear
devices .

They are indicative of the growth of human expectations and,

- 3 hopefully, of human enlightenment.

They are problems, however, which

despite these new twists, are still undergirded by the vast heritage of
human ignorance, fear, want, and hostility from which no part of the
gl.obe is free.
The iceberg of change which has moved in international affairs
during the past two decades helps to explain the emergence of the U.N.
and other international organizations.

It is relevant to the social in-

stability and the militarism which have largely followed the ending of
19th century colonial er a, notably in Afri ca .

It is involved in the

Asian catacylsms--the great economic stirr ings in Japan, the immense uncertainties which brood over India and Pakistan and the political tidal
waves which, at intervals, have rolled through Chinese society.
The many-sided changes in the human condition during the past
two decades also explain the first military alliance in peacetime between
ourselves and Western Europe as well as the first major military involvements of the United States on the Asian mainland .

They help to explain,

finally, the awakening of this nation to the problems which confront the
world and ourselves as participants in its indivisible desti ny .
It used to be that we tended to stand apart and aloof from the
affairs of the rest of the globe.

Some have called that period of our

history which led up to Wor ld War II, the age of isolation.
terization is glib and somewhat misleading.

The charac-

:·Te were not so much isolated

as we were insulated by a fortuitous geographic endowment .

The greater

part of the nation's historic energies, therefore, could, and, fortunately
did, go inward into the development of a rich, ample, and sparsely settled
land .

tfe had little need or inclination which would stimulate us to

look much beyond this endowment for our needs and--if I may use the term--

- 4 for our kicks .

Except to sustain a limited curiosity and to satisfy a

few exotic wants, we avoided an extensive overseas projection of American
power, particularly outside the lfestern Hemisphere .

From a distance, we

were content to hold ourselves up to the rest of the world, on the basis
of great material achievements and the political heritage of the American
Revolution, as a prime example of the perfectability of the national experience .
Since World War II, however, we have found ourselves plunged,
hands, feet, ani bead into the mainstream of the world's affairs .
did not seek this role .

'>le did not want it .

\-le

Most of us still find the

clothes of a great international power, costly, ill-fitting and uncomfortable.

Nevertheless, we are unable to get out of them.

There is even

the probability that some of us have learned not only to tolerate this new
garb, but to like it.
In any event, as a sequel to World War II, this nation has come
onto the center of the stage of international affairs.

In this leading

role we have expended an immense amount of resources, energy, and money
for a great variety of purposes .

We have developed all manner of costly

intelligence and informational services.

We have developed towering

military services whose annual cost is now around $70 billion.
We have fought one war in Asia, and are now engaged in a second.
We have narrowly missed involvement in several other peripheral clashes
elsewhere . More than twenty years after t-lorld Har II, we still have something on the order of agreements for mutual security
nations.

'fTi

th 40 or more

These agreements, in effect, are commitments to military action

everywhere on the globe, except, perhaps, the Antarctic.
air force is on a minutes- alert.

The strategic

Intercontinental and other missiles are

- 5 pre-set for

insto.~lt

retaliatory launching .

navy patrols the seven seas .

Day and night the Amer ican

American soldiers are stationed in many

.1ations abroadj in Europe and Viet Ham, they number in tne hundreds of
thousands .
These far-flung commitments have been questioned from time to
time .

In my judgment, it is most proper that pertinent questions be

raised about them .

Not only do they involve great expenditures of public

funds , they carry, at all times, immense implications for the ver y survival
of the nation and civilization.

As 1 see it, we have undertaken so many

and scattered defense obligations that any need for the simultaneous honor ing of a group of these commitments would find us hard-pr essed to pr ovi de
even a l i mited response .

For that reason, if for no other, it seems to

me we would be well-advised to look closely at these military commitments
and activities and to weigh carefully their contempor ary value .
I t would be futile, however, to consider them in a vacuum .
Effective surveillance must relate to the central concerns of our for eign
policy which, pr esumably, gave rise to them in the first place.

It be-

hooves us to see as clearly as possible whether our under standing of these
concer ns is up to date .

It is incumbent upon us to test and test again

the r eflexes of our policies not only for adequacy but for excess .
It will serve no useful purpose to continue to measure these
r eflexes of policy by the sort of gener alities which are expr essed by the
terms "isolationism" or "inter nationalism. '' Hhatever may have been the
case years ago, these yardsticks have long since lost their per tinence .
The labels are no guarantee of the efficacy of any course of action or
non- action i n international relations .

~.fhat

is essential is not the name .

What is essential is that the course is timely and adjusts the bonafide
interests of the nation to the realities of the contemporary wor ld .

- 6 I speak in nll candor ;.rhen I say that there have been tendencies
under both Democratic and Republican administrations for foreign policy to
lag behind these realities .

Until recently, a kind of inertia, for ex-

ample, has existed with regard to one of the central concerns of American
foreign policy-- the United States-Soviet confrontation in Europe.

Until

recently, we have been most reluctant to bring ourselves to face, in policy,
the changes which have taken place on that continent.
To be sure, President Eisenhower sought in his administration to
restore at least a measure of civility in the conduct of U.S.-Soviet affairs,
by his personal associations with the leaders of the Soviet Union.

To be

sure, President Kennedy, in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, removed a rigidity
which, for years had decreed that agreements should not be concluded with
the Soviet Union .

It has only been in the last year or two, however, that

as a nation we have begun to explore fully the implications of change in
Europe and to react to its potentialities in terms of our interests and
world peace.
Yet substantial change has been manifest for some time in inner
developments in both Eastern Europe and in Western Europe and between the
two regions .

In Eastern Europe, the immediate postwar isolation from the

West was a severe one.

It was compounded of political and war-born

vendettas, ideological parochialisms, reci~cal fears and the in-turning
of human energy to meet the massive demands of post-war reconstruction.
Especially since the death of Stalin, however, there has been a general
loosening of the ideological and other
Europe .

~
*
' t '.-jackets throughout Eastern

There has also been a growing response on the part of governments

there to consumer needs, the satisfaction of which involves greatly expanded commerce with the non-Communist world .

- 7 As indicative of the breadth of change, communications, travel,
cultural exchange and other contacts have grown r apidly between Eastern
and \-Iestern Europe.

The rise of trade levels between the two regions has

been very pronounced, and it should be noted that, Berlin Wall notwithstanding, \-Test Germany leads all other non-Communist nations in commerce
with Eastern Europe .
For those who read the tea leaves of official sociability, moreover, I would call attention to the recent visits of President Podgorny of
the Soviet Union to Italy and the first reception of a Chief of that State
by the Pope, as well as Premier Kosygin's warm receptions in Paris and
London .

One may attach such values as he chooses to these events .

facts of change in Europe, however , speak for themselves.

The

The talk of

war subsides; the sounds of intra-European cooperation are heard mor e
clearly on all sides .

The European detente has not only begun, it is

already well-advanced.
Our reaction to change in Europe includes the groundwork of
President Eisenhower and President Kennedy as well as the bridge- building
of President Johnson, all of which I have already mentioned .
\/hat is involved in the latter case is a sustained effort in
the direction of r estoring normalcy to our relations with the Soviet
Union and a significant reduction in the military rivalry which, wittingly
or unwittingly, could lead to a catastrophic conflict .
A number of significant agreements with the Soviet Union are
already involved in this effort .

They deal with cultural exchanges,

consular questions, commercial aviation, and the peaceful use of outer
space.

Negotiations are also anticipated, in the near future, to try to

limit the incredibly costly rivalry of adding successive and reciprocal
"antis" to the ballistic missile systems of each nation .

An attempt is

- 8 also likely to be made to remove certain long-standing and self- imposed
hindrances in law to our peaceful trade with the Eastern European countries.
Many of these measures, of course, involve not only the President
but also action by the Congress and, particularly, by the Senate.

And,

certainly, they involve under standing on the part of the people of the
nation .

However, emotions run deep on any question of U. S. relations with

Communist nations , particularly, in the light of the bloody conflict in
Viet Nam .

I am frank to say that I have my own reticences about the pursuit

of agreements with nations on one side of the globe, while a war against us
is being waged with their help on the other .

The best judgments we can

obtain, however, tell us that the rejection of the contemplated agreements
with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will not make the slightest difference in the situation in Viet Nam .

It will, in no way, diminish our

casualties or hasten the conclusion of the conflict .
In those circumstances, I do not see that it serves our purposes
to turn our backs on agreements which would otherwise be in the interest
of this nation .

I do not see that we advance the cause of peace by re-

fusing to build more stable relations for peace whenever and wherever an
opportunity to do so pr esents itself .
Moreover , bridge-building to Eastern Europe is not unrelated to
the possibility of making constructive changes in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, changes which would also serve the nation ' s interests .

For

many years, six divisions of American forces have been consigned to N.A.T .O.
in Western Europe.

These forces and their dependents involve a U.S . mili-

tary establishment in \-!estern Europe of well over half a million Americans .
It is an undertaking which represents an expenditure of billions of dollars
of public funds each year .

Yet, I would not begrudge one cent of these
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in Europe, today, as they were believed to be when dispatched there years
a~ .

But is that the case?

I have already mentioned the change in the

general climate in Europe which expresses itself in a rapidly growing trade
ani the expansion of other friendly relations.

It should also be noted that

within Western Europe, there are obvious doubts about the need for the
maintenance of N.A.T.O. at the str ength in which it was previously projected .
Indeed, the French no longer see any requirement for the presence of

u.s.

forces, at least not in France, and they have withdrawn their own detachments from N.A.T.O. Command .

The United Kingdom has reduced its commitment

of men and resources to the Continent and has announced further reductions
unless West Germany is prepared to neutralize the exchange costs of maintaining these forces on the Rhine .

Other Western Europeans to a greater

or lesser degree appear to regard their N.A .T .O. commitments in the same
non-urgent fashion .
It is now very evident that the United States alone has felt
deeply the need to sustain the full military burden of the earlier common
commitment to N.A.T.O.

Our allies in Western Europe are much closer to

the firing line; yet, in a period of unprecedented economic prosperity they
are most unwilling to carry their pledged share .

In effect, the Western

Europeans have made adjustments in their commitments to N.A.T .O. to reflect
over- all changes in Europe and they have made these adjustments unilaterally .
The contrast in performance between ourselves and Western Europe
regarding commitments to N.A .T.O. in my judgment, is becoming almost an
embarrassment .

It moves us apart from the mainstream of European develop-

ments and is likely to become a source of friction on both sides which, in
the end, can only be harmful to the interests of both sides.

- 10 In all frankness, I find it difficult to acquiesce in Executive
Branch fears for Western Europe 1 s safety which are obviously far greater
than the fear of the Europeans themselves.

In all frankness, I find some

lack of dignity in the lengths to which these fears have carried our
diplomacy.

We have begged, badgered and buttered Western Europe in an

effort to stimulate a greater contribution to N.A.T.O .

In all frankness,

I did not relish this nation having been placed in the position of wearing
out its welcome in France .

I should not like to see that experience re-

peated elsewhere in Europe.

Yet it may well be repeated unless there is

a willingness to make timely adjustments .
I have, therefore, joined with 43 other Senators in the introduc tion of a resolution which recommends to the President that the Executive
Branch make substantial reductions in the present deployment of our forces
in Western Europe .

Personally, I have felt for several years that two or

three rather than six divisions would be more than sufficient to underscore
our adher ence to the North Atlantic Treaty .

That figure is in line with

estimates of present need which have been advanced by General Eisenhower
and General Gavin, both of whom have had a long association with this
question.

I find it most difficult to comprehend why two divisions are any

less effective than six in serving notice that we regard the pledge of the
North Atlantic Treaty as binding and our national security as inseparable
from that of the North Atlantic region.

To talk of six divisions as a

manifestation of international resolution and two divisions as an indication
of a revived isolationism is to reveal how irrelevant if not downright misleading these terms have become .
On the other side of the globe, in Asia, there looms another
central concern of American foreign policy.

It is the confrontation with

China, across the littoral states of Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Viet Nam.
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Almost two decades have passed since the collapse of the national
government on the Chinese mainland and its retreat to the island of Taiwan .
That event, which occurred when most of you were too young for it to be
noticed, was catac,lysmic in its consequences .

It sundered the fabric of

Chinese society and, almost overnight, brought about the disintegration of
a main pillar of postwar American foreign policy .

In the rubble, the watch -

word became "wait for the dust to settle" before doing anything about China .
Over the years, the cut-off of contact between ourselves and the
Chinese mainland has become, for all practical purposes, total .
do not go there.

Mainland Chinese do not come here.

Americans

There is not only an

absence of personal contact, there is also a complete absence of trade and
communications .

Indeed, of all the nations of the world we alone have not

only maintained a primary boycott for many years but also seek to enforce
a secondary boycott on Chinese exports.
He have had brief confrontations with Chinese spokesmen on various
issues over the years, notably at the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962.
Our sole continuing diplomatic contact with the Peking government, however,
has been the meetings between the U. S. and Chinese Ambassadors in Poland
which have gone on regularly for many years and at which no business of
significance, so far as I am aware, has been conducted.
In short, "waiting for the dust to settle," has remained the
watchword of this nation ' s relations with three -quarters of a billion
Chinese through the administrations of three Presidents .
dust has not settled.

In truth, the

The initial hostility between a revolutionary China

for which we had had little sympathy and ourselves was followed almost
immediately by the Korean Conflict in which we became directly engaged in
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military conflict with the Chinese .
the islands

~f

Thereafter came the near conflict at

Quemoy and Matsu in the Taiwan Straits .

And now, there is

again conflict, this time, by proxy in Viet tram .
Hithin China, during these years there have been momentous events
which have al so added to the difficulties and uncertainties of developing
a cohesive policy towards the Chinese mainland.
nucl ear

The Chinese have exploded

devices at Lop Nor in the \·!estern Asian desert of Sinkiang.

Recent

ideological conflicts have sent great tremors through the whole of the inner
political structure of China .

There has been, finally, the great cleavage

in Si no-Soviet revolutionary solidarity which has torn apart almost all of
the relationships between the two giantnations of the Eurasian Continent .
In the context of these events , it is not surprising that the dust,
for the settlement of which American policy has waited eighteen years , is
heavier than ever .

The obscurity, moreover , is not likely to be dispelled

in the near future .

There i s nothing in the recent history of China which

suggests that it will be easier tomorrow than it is today for us to see
clearly a direction for effective pol icy.

Hhatever course of American rela-

tions wi th China, it wi ll have to be pursued in spite of the dust with which
the situation is covered.
Clear- cut choices cannot be expected to be available to us any
time in the foreseeable future .

On the contrary, American decisions respect -

ing China must inevitably contain a large measur e of subjectivity and prayer .
Ever -present, will be the poss i bili ty of error .

These considerations , may

I say, apply not only to what we may do respecting China but to what we do
not do .

The uncertainties and the risks exist no less in the principle of

of non -approach to which we have adhered over these years of our times .

... 13 Hist~ry

to or

will someday

subtracti~n

es ~imate

the contribution of this principle--its addition

from the interests of the United States and the stability

and peace of the Hestern Pacific.
Under the present approach, for example, we know from a distance
that a great fire rages in the

~ore

of Chinese Communism.

The manifestations

are plain in the roars of the Red Guards, in the denunciations and counterdenunciations, in the sudden fall of long - established revolutionaries .

They

are documented in the inflamatory ideographs which are slashed over the
streets and walls of Peking and the other citadels of Chinese Communist power .
They are suggested in the political bewilderment which is seen in coastal
cities and in the provinces along the inner borders of China and other remote
areas .
Indeed, the present turmoil , is such as to make clear that Communist
political control which, for nearly two decades, was held by many to be total
and irreversible and to extend all the way fr0m Moscow to the farthest reaches
of China is actually considerably less than absolute, even in its extension
from Peking to the distant Chinese provinces .
He can also note, from afar, the serious difficulties between the
Soviet Union and China.
cal realm.

The strains have long been explicit in the ideologi -

They have also become increasingly evident in the tension along

the Sino-Soviet frontier which runs for thousands of miles between the two
count ries.

\·That appears involved here is an expression of the historic pro-

jection of Czarist Russian interests across the Asian mainland towards
~ laska

and which, before it receded to more tractable limits, had spread

even as far as California and Hawaii.

This basic Russian projection to the

East persists and rubs against China, at least in border regions of Manchuria,

- 14 Mongolia, and in Sinkiang Province .

Conversely, an historic Chinese interest

remains in many parts of Soviet Asia which at various times have been under
at least nominal Chinese authority .

The clash of national interests of the

two nations, in short, is very real and so, too, are the irredentist hostilities which it engenders.
These hostilities have been a major element in the cycle of everincreasing bitterness in Chinese- Soviet relations over the past few years .
How long this cycle will last and how it will end are matters of conjecture .
Whatever the possibilities, if any, of more effective adjustment of our
policies in the light of this and other trends, however, we are inhi bited
from their pursuit by our current approach or, rather, non-approach to
mainland China.
Let me turn, finally, to the immediate and over-riding problem of
policy, to the situation in Viet Nam.
of our foreign relations

aP~,

Viet Nam affects every other aspect

particularly, the two central concerns .

It

diminishes our capacity to deal constructively with the United States-Soviet
confrontation in Europe .

To put it mildly, it multiplies the problems of

the confrontation with China in Asia.
It is ironic that once again in Viet Nam, as in Korea, a country
so small and remote from our interests as to be outside the range of even
public curiosity a few years ago has become the major preoccupation of the
United States .

It is ironic that, for the second time in a generation, we

find ourselves in a devastating war on the borders of China--not with China-but with a people who have had no tradition of hostility towards the United
States and who have far more historic reason than do we for mutual hostility
with the Chinese.
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by the current

deeply we are engaged in this ironic situation is indicated
c~ncentration

of United States mil itary force in Southeast

Asia and, particularly, in Viet Nam.

We hsve well in excess of

military personnel on the ground in South Viet ITam.

4oo,ooo

There are al so approxi -

mately 75, 000 men on the 7th Fleet in adjacent waters and 35, 000 more in
Thailand with responsibiliti es that are tied cl osely into the situation in
VietNam.

In short, we have committed to this confl ict over 500, 000 members

of the Armed Servic es and materiel and equipment i n unprecedented quantiti es
and this immense consignment is supported by additional mil itary strength
of all kinds on Okinawa, the Philippines , and Guam.
He are i n a limited war in which , by becoming deeply engaged, we
hav e managed to save from collapse the gover nment of South Viet Nam i n Sai gon.
The objectives of our mil itary engagement are confi ned entirely to the
southern half of Viet Ham.

This limited war of l imited objectives, never -

theless, has already engaged more American forces than Korea .
more than Korea .

It has incurred plane and helicopter l osses greatly in

excess of those in Korea .
Korea .

It has cost

It is a more difficul t and dangerous war than

It is a more bitter and barbaric war .

It i s a war whose end i s not

yet in sight, by military a ction or by a negotiated diplomatic solution .
That is the reality of the situation in VietNam.
didly it is faced the better off we will be .

The more can-

At this point, the question

of how or why we became invol ved is moot and so are regrets over our invol ve ment .

In my judgment, the question now i s how can this war be ended at the

soonest possibl e moment in an honorable peace for ourselves and for all
deeply enmeshed in it.

In short, the question is how can it be ended under

honorabl e circumstances , before the spreading devastation, not only in North

• 16 Viet Nam, but even more, in South Viet Ham, makes a hideous mockery of the
original objective

~f

helping the Vietnamese people.

I do not believe that we can end this war by slogans of "get in or
get out."

It cannot be ended by personal criticism of the President and

the Vice President, Ambassador Goldberg and other leaders of the Administration or members of the Senate, regardless of the positions which they take
on this issue.

I am frank to say that this criticism, at times, goes far

beyond the merely ungracious and borders on the disgraceful.

President

Johnson wants this war ended in an honorable peace and every Senator I know,
and I know them all, wants the same thing.

If there are differences among

us they are differences of understanding, interpretation, and method.
In my personal view, and I have made it clear many times, the
conflict cannot be terminated in an honorable fashion by a withdrawal of
the United States at this time although an honorable settlement must eventually involve the withdrawal of United States forces.
The only practical avenue which I see open, for the present, is
to seek to mitigate the horror of the conflict and to restrain its spread,
while endeavoring to pursue any avenue, byway, route or whatever, as the
President has sought to do, which might lead to the negotiating table.

That

there has not yet been an initiation of substantial contact for peace is no
argument against the continuance of the effort to make that contact.

There

can be no relaxation until the war is brought to an end in negotiations.
It is essential that we pursue peace in Viet Nam in all sincerity and with
all diligence not only because, in this situation, peace has a rational and
moral validity, but also because a prompt settlement is in the interests of
the Vietnamese people and the interests of the American people.

- 17 I must say, with great regret, that signs of a settlement in the
near future are l acking .
spreading devastation.

There is, instead, the fact of an ugly war of
All the while, the

~pti~ns

are running out; the

alternatives which might lead to negotiations grow fewer .
Many pr0posals have been put forth and many have been explored.
As

an example, over the past year or more I have publicly called attention

to these possible easements of the situation and for eventual settlement:
1.

In lieu of aerial bombardment of North Viet Nam,
the sealing off of the borders of the 17th parallel,
through Laos;

2.

A reconvening of the Geneva Conference on the basis
of the 1954 and

1962

agreements by call of the co-

chairmen, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union,
or by any participating conferees;

3· An all -Asian conference at Rangoon or Tokyo or any
other suitable location to consider the conditions
of an honorable peace;
4.

The inclusion in any peace conference of whatever
belligerents may be necessary to bring about a
termination of the conflict in Viet Nam;

5. An enlargement of the Manila Conference of 1966 into
a follow-up conference, to i nclude friend and foe alike;

6. A face -to -face meeting of the Secretary of State, Dean
Rusk, and the Foreign Minister of the Peking government
to discuss the restoration of peace in Viet Nam.

- 18 In

additi~n,

I have urged that the

cl~sest

consideration be given

to informed French views on Viet Nam and to the views of the Cambodian
Premier, Prince Norodrym Sihanouk.
and Mrs. Gandhi be considered.

I have urged that the proposals of U Thant

I have endorsed various statements of the

President, Secretary Rusk, and Ambassador Goldberg, all of which have made
clear that not only our proposals but also those of Hanoi and the People's
Liberation Front might provide a basis for settlement.

I have recommended

that there be not just a cessation of the bombing of North Viet Nam but
that all killing stop, on both sides, in a cease-fire and standfast, on
the ground and in the waters adjacent to Viet Nam as well as over Viet Nam,
to the end that efforts may be made to initiate talks.
In some of these proposals, the President has concurred and has
had them pursued by his diplomats.

All of them, he has had examined and

if they have not been pursued, I can only conclude that there have been
sound reasons for not pursuing them.

Suggestions for peace have come from

many sources; the actual pursuit of peace in the past year, however, has
been by diplomacy and, largely, by secret diplomacy .

Indeed, that is the

case even with the efforts of the distinguished Secretary General of the
United Nations 1 U Thant.

In his attempts to bring about peace in Viet Nam,

U Thant has acted in his personal and diplomatic capacity rather than in his
Secretarial capacity of carrying out organizational decisions of the United
Nations.
The fact is that the U. N., as an organization, has not yet
entered into the Vietnamese problem.

Some limited useoof the U. N. in this

fashion, may I say, was proposed in an address which I delivered at Johns
Hopkins University in November, 1966.

At the time, it was not suggested
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direct~

into the substance of the dispute;

that course presents great difficulties because neither North Viet Nam nor
China are member states .

Hhat I did suggest, however, was an entirely

proper and precedented procedural initiative by the United Nations.

The

Security Council can issue, at any time , by majority vote a call to all
belligerents in Viet Nam to convene in its forum.

It would be entirely in

order for an invitation of this kind to include both China and North Viet Nam.
It was further

8 uggested

last November that a basis for a negoti-

ated settlement could begin to be sought in a Security Council request to
the International Court for an advisory opinion on the applicability of the
Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962.

I am delighted to note, in passing, that

Congress only last week expressed its overwhelming formal endorsement of
these agreements as a basis for a negotiated settlement .
I betray no confidences when I note that, on request, I interrupted
a brief vacation last fall to go to New York for the sole purpose of discuss ing these two proposals regarding the possible usage of the U. N. organizatio.
with Ambassador Goldberg and the Secretary-General.

On the basis of these

discussions it seemed preferable at the time that the search for peace then
being actively pursued be continued via the private avenues of diplomacy
rather than in the forum of the Security Council.
That was many weeks and months ago .

In the interim, intense and

many- sided efforts of diplomacy have been exerted through many private
channels to find the key to peace .

Hopes rose during the cease-fires at

the Christmas holidays and at Tet, the Oriental New Year.

However, in the

end, diplomacy not only was unable to find a road to negotiations , it was not
able even to bring about an extension of these truces .
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The Pope tried.
Secretary~eneral ~f

The Russian and British leaders have tried.

The

the U. N., in his diplomatic capacity, has tried .

Ambassador Goldberg has tried countless times.

Many other diplomats and

officials of the Executive Branch of the government have tried.
The strenuous efforts of traditional diplomacy have been unavailing .

As indicated by recent statements of both Ambassador Goldberg and

U Thant, the slender reed of hope has shrivel ed.

There is now no immediate

prospect on the hor izon, except f or the intensification of the confl ict.
That, indeed, is already in progr ess .

The casual ties increase; the devasta -

tion grows; the dangers of expanded war multiply.
In the circumstances , it seems to me that a contribution to peace
might well be sought in public from the United Nations as an organization.
The

Secretary~eneral 's

personal efforts to date have been dedicated and

strenuous and he is entitl ed to the gratitude and support of the entire
world community.

With a11 due r espect , however , there are other resources

for peace inherent in the Uni ted Nations, as an
gone untapped and untried .

The

u.

~rganization,

which have

N. does have a responsibility to try to

contribute to the r esolution of thi s confl ict .

That responsibil ity is

expli cit i n the Char ter and ev ery member nati on, including ourselves,
shar es that r esp onsibility by sol emn Treaty obl igation .
It seems to me that the cause of a peaceful and honorabl e settlement may possibly be advanced--certainly it cannot be hurt--by modest recourse
at this time to the procedural machinery of the United Nations .

In

my

judg-

ment, this nation should consi der seeking a face - to-face confrontation of
all belligerents at the United Nations .

Following the Korean precedents,

it seems to me eminently desirable that this government give every consideration to a possible initiative which would bring to a
Council two resolutions along the following lines:

v~te

in the Security
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that the Security Council invite all belligerents, direct

and indirect, including China and North Viet Nam, to participate in an
open discussion of the conflict in Viet Nam and ways and means of ending
it;
Two, that the Security Council request the International Court
to render an advisory opinion on the current applicability of the Geneva
Accords of 1954 and 1962 and the obligations which these agreements may
place on the present belligerents in Viet Nam.
1.Jbether or not there is much prospect of a positive response from
others in no way lessens the desirability of offering these resolutions in
good faith and bringing them to a vote .

In my judgment, an American initia-

tive of this kind serves not only our interests but the interests of peace
in Viet Nam.
Let me conclude, now, by clarifying one point:

the conflict in

VietNam cannot be settled from the Congress or from the campus.

In the

end, if it is to be settled honorably, there is only one Constitutional
officer of your government who can speak for you and for the entire nation
in its foreign relations .

\.Jbether we agree with him or not, whether we like

him or not, whether we abhor him or love him, that man is the President of
the United States .
In a government such as ours, a Senator lives with a Constitution,
a constituency, and a conscience.

All three considerations underlie the

suggestions respecting Viet Nam which have been made here today and others
which have been expressed on other occasions.

President Johnson and all

the Presidents who have gone before him have listened to advice from many
sources, including the Senate .
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It is the President, however, who makes the fundamental decisions
of foreign policy.

These decisions are of an immensity which enjoins upon

us all a high respect for the burdens which a President must bear and a
responsibility to tender to him every support which can be given in good
conscience.

In the end, these decisions will determine--insofar as it lies

with this nation to determine--the moment of peace in Viet Nam and Asia.

